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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
TYRONE ROANE,
                                  Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00048-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 2, 2009
Before:  FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND,  District Judge.*
(Filed: June 18, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2DIAMOND, District Judge.
Tyrone Roane appeals from his conviction for possession with intent to distribute
more than five grams of cocaine base; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime; and felon in possession of a firearm.  21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B);
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 922(g)(1).  Roane argues that the District Court: 
1) improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence; and 2) should have declared a
mistrial after at least one member of the jury briefly saw Roane in handcuffs at the start of
his trial.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review the denial of a suppression motion for clear error as to the factual
findings, and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of law to those
facts.  United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 166 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Coles,
437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006).
We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.  United
States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2007).
3III.
Because we write primarily for the Parties, we will summarize only those facts
pertinent to our analysis.
On March 27, 2007, a “reliable source” described to Wilmington Police a man who
was selling drugs at 2201 North Pine Street.  (App. I at 21.)  A short time later, Officers
Kurt Bryson and Shawn Gordon drove by the North Pine Street address in a marked
vehicle and saw Roane (who matched the informant’s description), sitting outside the
residence, which police later learned was owned by Victoria Jones.  (Id. at 21-22.)
When the officers again drove past the house, Bryson called to Roane: “Hey, come
here.”  (Id. at 22.)  Roane immediately jumped up and ran onto the porch, disregarding
Bryson’s repeated direction that he stop.  (Id.)  As the police pursued Roane through the
Jones house, a third officer, Brian Witte, waited behind the residence.  (Id. at 23.)  Roane
left the house through the back door, saw Witte, and threw two white objects and a black
object – which Witte believed was a handgun – into a neighboring yard. (Id.)  Roane then
ran back to the rear door of the house, where he encountered police, who arrested him. 
(Id. at 24.)
Roane moved to suppress, inter alia, the evidence police recovered from the
neighboring property: a black handgun and two bags of cocaine base.  (App. II at 34.) 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Court denied Roane’s Motion.  (App. I at
20-32.)
4Shortly after Roane’s trial began on March 12, 2008, security personnel informed
Counsel that jurors may have accidentally glimpsed Roane in handcuffs as he left the
courtroom.  (App. II at 248-49.)  The defense immediately moved for a mistrial.  (Id. at
249.)  The trial judge denied the Motion without prejudice to renew after the jurors were
individually questioned.  (Id.)  The judge and the Parties agreed that to avoid creating
prejudice, the voir dire would not include any explicit reference to Roane being
handcuffed.  (Id. at 254-63.)  The trial judge thus asked each juror whether he or she: 
1) had seen Roane after the jurors were dismissed for lunch; and 2) heard anyone else
mention seeing Roane after the jurors were dismissed.  If a juror answered yes to either
question, the judge asked whether:  1) that information affected the juror’s ability to judge
Roane fairly and impartially; and 2) the juror understood that Roane was presumed
innocent and that the Government bears the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  (Id. at 265-80.)
During individual voir dire:  1) a juror said he saw Roane in handcuffs, but did not
discuss it with anyone; 2) a juror stated that she heard that “some” jurors had seen Roane
in handcuffs and that this was discussed by at least three jurors; and 3) a juror stated that
he heard “a few jokes made” among the jurors that Roane could not flee because he was
in handcuffs.  (Id.)  These jurors also stated that nothing they had seen or heard would
affect their ability to decide the case fairly and impartially, that they understood that
Roane is presumed innocent and that the Government bears the burden of proving guilt
5beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Id.)  Crediting the jurors’ testimony, the judge again denied
Roane’s renewed motion for a mistrial, and cautioned the entire jury as follows:
You must make your decision, as you know, in this case based only on the
evidence that you see and hear in this courtroom.  Do not let rumors,
suspicions, or anything else that you may see or hear outside of this
courtroom influence your decision in any way.
(Id. at 292.)
In its final instructions, the District Court again cautioned the jury respecting the
Government’s burden of proof and the presumption of innocence.  In addition, the Court
again reminded the jury of its obligation to be fair and to decide the case solely on the
evidence presented in Court.  (App. III at 574-88.)
IV.
Although Roane contends that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigative stop, he does not argue that their seizure of the gun and drugs
was the result of that stop.  Presumably this is because the police never conducted an
investigative stop of Roane, who fled as soon as the police called to him.  Thus, the
District Court correctly concluded that Defendant was not “seized” until after he
discarded his gun and drugs.  See United States v. Crandall, 554 F.3d 79, 84 (3d Cir.
2009).
As the Supreme Court explained, mere police pursuit of a fleeing individual does
not constitute a stop or a seizure.  Rather, a Fourth Amendment stop or seizure occurs
only once the individual submits to the authority of law enforcement or is subject to the
6application of physical force.  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“An
arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the
assertion of authority.”).  Accordingly, the Hodari D. Court held that because the fleeing
defendant had discarded contraband before he was seized by police, the contraband was
not the fruit of that seizure and not subject to suppression.  Id. at 626.  We have held
similarly.   See United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).
Because the police did not physically seize Roane and Roane did not otherwise
submit to the officers’ authority before discarding the gun and drugs, there was no
investigative stop – or any other Fourth Amendment seizure – that preceded or compelled
Roane’s abandonment of the gun and drugs.  See United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d
350, 358 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f the police make a show of authority and the suspect does
not submit, there is no seizure.”).  Accordingly, because the recovery of the contraband
was not the fruit of any Fourth Amendment violation, the District Court properly denied
Roane’s motion to suppress.
Roane also argues that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial after a juror
briefly saw Roane in handcuffs.  With other courts of appeals, we have long held that a
brief, unintended glimpse of a defendant in handcuffs is not inherently prejudicial and
does not require a mistrial without an affirmative showing of actual prejudice.  See
United States v. Chrzanowski, 502 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1974) (“The fact that jurors
may briefly see a defendant in handcuffs is not so inherently prejudicial as to require a
7mistrial.”); United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991) (collecting
cases).
Roane believes he made out actual prejudice through the inconsistent answers two
jurors gave on voir dire:  1) one juror testified that she heard at least three jurors discuss
that Roane was in handcuffs, yet only one other juror admitted hearing it discussed; and
2) the only juror to acknowledge seeing Roane in handcuffs stated that he did not discuss
it with anyone.
These inconsistencies are not significant.  The trial judge asked jurors only general
questions regarding what, if anything, they might have seen or heard after being
dismissed for lunch.  That a juror may not have thought to mention seeing Roane in
handcuffs – or hearing another juror discuss it – hardly indicates that the juror was lying. 
On the contrary, the District Court – which was certainly in the best position to determine
credibility – found that the jurors were truthful.  Moreover, all the challenged jurors
confirmed under oath both their ability to be fair and impartial to Roane and their
understanding that the Government had the burden of proving Roane guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Moreover, as we have described, the judge also gave the entire jury
further instructions reiterating their obligation to be fair and follow the law.
In these circumstances, we believe that Roane has not shown actual prejudice and
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.  See
United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir. 2000).
8V.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
